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Globalisation and the Transformation of the Tax State 
ABSTRACT 
How does globalisation affect taxation? The academic wisdom is split on this ques-
tion. Some argue that globalisation spells the beginning of the end of the national tax 
state while others maintain that it hardly constrains tax policy choices at all. This pa-
per comes down in the middle. It finds no indication that globalisation will fatally 
undermine the national tax state, but still maintains that national tax policy is affected 
in a major way. The effect is not so much to force change upon the tax state as to re-
duce its freedom for change. Comparing the first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury to the last three decades, it is remarkable how much change and innovation there 
was then and how much incrementalism and stasis there is today. 
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Globalisation and the Transformation of the Tax State∗ 
NATIONAL TAXES AND GLOBAL MARKETS 
Taxes are monetary levies imposed by governments on persons or other entities. They 
are compulsory and unrequited: taxpayers are legally obliged to pay taxes and cannot 
expect to receive any specific benefit in return, such as, for example, a piece of public 
property or a particular health care treatment in a public hospital. Taxes are not fees. 
While taxes are presumably collected for the sake of the public good, the liability of 
the individual taxpayer is independent of the personal utility she derives from that 
good. This is what makes taxes such a nuisance for the taxpayer and such a versatile 
source of finance for the state.  
Over past centuries, taxes have become the main basis of governmental revenue. 
The modern state is, in Joseph A. Schumpeter’s words, a ‘tax state’ (Schumpeter 
1918). It is sovereign because, and to the extent that, it disposes of tax revenue. The 
availability of tax revenue determines what the state can and cannot do, how many 
civil servants it can hire, how many services it can deliver, how modestly or ambi-
tiously it can define its goals, and how effectively it can impose its authority domesti-
cally and internationally. In a very real sense, therefore, ‘the revenue of a state is the 
state’ (Burke [1790] 1999), which in turn implies that public finance is ‘the key’ to 
understanding what the state is and how it changes (Goldscheid 1917).  
As even a cursory look confirms, the history of public finance is one of misery and 
drama. Rare are the moments of fiscal abundance and ease. Most of the time, finance 
ministers feel strapped for cash and are barely able to make public ends meet. Fiscal 
stress is nothing unusual; it is the normal state of affairs in public finance. What varies 
over time, however, is the interpretation of where the stress is coming from. During 
the 1990s, a lot of the blame went to globalisation. The opening of national economies 
was feared to undermine the ability of national governments to subject their econo-
mies to tax. Tax sovereignty seemed to evaporate in global markets.  
The crisis has been long in coming. The liberalisation of the world economy has 
been going on for almost fifty years now, and for almost equally as long there has 
been unease and concern about its negative implications for tax policy. The purpose 
of this paper is to trace the evolution of these concerns, and to analyse how national 
tax states have coped with them. The following section briefly summarizes the charac-
teristics of national taxation systems before the onset of deep globalisation in the 
1980s and 1990s. The next section analyses how these characteristics were challenged 
                                                 
∗ Comments by Berit Dencker, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Stefan Leibfried, Thomas Rixen, and Ingo Rohlfing are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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by globalisation, and a subsequent section looks at tax policy reactions to these chal-
lenges. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of the future of the tax state in 
a global economy. 
TAXES IN NATIONAL CONTAINMENT  
The tax systems of OECD countries are products and symptoms of economic closure. 
Their main components—taxes on private and corporate income, consumption taxes 
on goods and services, and social security contributions—were conceived between 
1910 and 1970 when national borders were relatively closed to economic transactions. 
The progressive income tax made its breakthrough in the huge fiscal expansion during 
the First World War. Taxes on general consumption were introduced on a broad front 
during the interwar years, when first inflation and then the depression cut into income 
tax revenues. Corporate income taxes made their debut at around the same time and, 
after the Second World War, developed into a standard tool of economic policy in 
OECD countries. The post-war period also saw a massive expansion of social security 
contributions to finance the build-up of the welfare state (Messere 2000; Steinmo 
1993). 
All these taxes were introduced in a context of clearly separated national markets. 
Trade barriers restricted international trade, and capital controls limited the interna-
tional movement of capital. Tax policy was a purely national affair. There was no 
international spillover because all effects were limited to the national market, and 
there was little escape from the national market. Tax policy was all voice and little 
exit. In those unusual cases where taxpayers had a viable chance to exit, the sentiment 
was not to adjust taxes in order to reduce the incentive for exit, but to increase the 
road blocks on the escape route in order to make exit impossible. The two main pro-
tagonists of the Bretton Woods negotiations, Harry Dexter White and Maynard 
Keynes, were united on this point: states need the freedom to increase capital controls 
when necessary to prevent capital flight. According to Eric Helleiner, they were moti-
vated by a desire to prevent the evasion of taxes and ‘the burdens of social legislation’ 
(Helleiner 1994). 
Behind the wall of capital controls and trade barriers, the tax state had a notably 
‘good twentieth century’ (Hood 2003). It grew vigorously: in the major industrial 
countries, the tax take as a share of GDP rose from an average of around 10 percent or 
less before World War I to around 30 percent fifty years later, and almost 40 percent 
at century’s end. This expansion was made possible by radical innovation and mod-
ernisation. While in the late nineteenth century most government revenues derived 
from customs, excises and property taxes, by mid-twentieth century personal income 
taxes, corporation taxes, social security contributions, and general consumption taxes 
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were already the main revenue raisers by far. Within fifty years, the tax state was put 
on an entirely new basis. Also, the tax state during the period of national containment 
enjoyed the liberty to develop in specifically national ways. The total tax take and the 
tax mix varied widely. Some countries relied heavily on indirect taxes, while others 
leaned mainly on direct taxes. Ireland, for example, derived more than 50 percent of 
its total tax revenues in 1970 from taxes on consumption while the same share in Lux-
embourg stood at less than 15 percent. Taxes that were popular in some countries 
were hardly used in others. For example, while social security contributions amounted 
to more than 13 percent of Dutch GDP in 1970, they raised barely 1.5 percent of GDP 
in Denmark. The level of total taxation also varied widely. In 1970 total tax revenue 
amounted to more than 40 percent of GDP in Denmark and less than 20 percent in 
Japan.  
THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISATION 
The size and heterogeneity of national tax systems were no cause for concern so long 
as the fences separating national markets were up. When these fences began to come 
down, however, cross-national differences in taxation started to give politicians head-
aches. There were four problems in particular that governments worried about: com-
petitiveness, tax evasion and avoidance, tax competition, and the transnationalisation 
of the tax base. Of course, these problems are not independent of one another; rather, 
they embody different aspects of the same syndrome—national taxation in a context 
of international markets. However, since they developed at different times and at dif-
ferent speeds, and triggered different political reactions, it is useful to consider them 
separately. 
Competitiveness 
The 1950s witnessed the first cautious reductions of trade barriers. At this time it was 
the implications of national taxes for the international competitiveness of national 
industries that most concerned tax policy makers. The reasoning was simple: if do-
mestic taxes imposed a higher tax burden on domestic producers than foreign taxes 
imposed on foreign competitors, then, absent offsetting customs regulations or quotas, 
domestic producers were at a competitive disadvantage. Their costs of production 
were higher with potentially negative consequences for profitability, output, and em-
ployment, and, indirectly, for tax revenues.  
The history of the European Coal and Steel Community provides a showcase ex-
ample of these concerns. Shortly after the Community had, with much fanfare, opened 
its Common Market for Coal and Steel, a fierce dispute erupted between Germany 
and France over trade and taxation. Germany charged high company but low turnover 
taxes, while France charged low company and high turnover taxes. The German gov-
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ernment suspected that this difference in taxation worked to the disadvantage of Ger-
man industry, because exports were routinely relieved of domestic turnover taxes but 
not of company taxes.1 As a consequence, French exports entered the German market 
free of high French turnover taxes, while German exports, in turn, entered the French 
market without compensation for high German company taxes. This disadvantage had 
been offset by tariffs and export subsidies in the past, and it was feared that the elimi-
nation of these protections in the Coal and Steel Community would leave Germany 
defenceless, ultimately resulting in ‘an extended “marché français” rather than a true 
“marché commun” ’ (Schmölders 1953:101). 
An expert panel under the economist Jan Tinbergen was hurriedly formed to settle 
the matter. It ruled that the German argument was wrong because any tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage for German exporters would be offset by automatic ex-
change rate adjustments (Tinbergen Report 1953). This so-called equivalence theorem 
was a striking academic achievement. Its practical value, however, was limited be-
cause exchange rates were fixed by the Bretton Woods system—and nobody wanted 
them to be flexible. There simply was no room for compensatory exchange rate ad-
justments. The tax conflict eventually died down because the French Franc was, for 
political reasons, fixed at such a high level that whatever advantage French producers 
might have had from their tax treatment was more than offset by the unfavourable 
exchange rate. The fear that high taxes might undermine national competitiveness 
remained, however, and continues to be a top concern of policy makers. 
Tax evasion and avoidance 
The erosion of the fences separating national markets accelerated during the 1960s. 
Not only did the Kennedy round of GATT negotiations and the EEC Customs Union 
result in further reductions of trade barriers, but the divisions between national capital 
markets were also breaking down. In part, this was the states’ own doing. By 1958 
most European countries had made their currencies fully convertible, and during the 
early 1960s they cautiously eased off capital controls. In part, however, it followed 
from processes beyond state control, namely the emergence of offshore capital mar-
kets and the rise of multinational companies. The resulting increase in the cross-
border movements of capital raised a new set of problems for tax authorities: interna-
tional tax avoidance and evasion, i.e., the reduction of tax liabilities by legal (avoid-
ance) and illegal (evasion) means.  
                                                 
1 This, of course, had practical reasons. While it is relatively straightforward to compute the turnover tax burden 
of goods, it is very difficult to estimate the company tax burden falling on goods. 
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Of course, there had always been an incentive for private investors to hold finan-
cial assets abroad in order to evade domestic taxes. For most intents and purposes, 
however, this incentive had been neutralised by the costs of escaping from or sur-
mounting capital controls. The partial reduction of capital controls in the EEC reduced 
these costs, and thus increased the attractiveness of tax evasion. Hence, when in the 
mid-1960s Belgium, Italy and Germany imposed new source taxes on capital income, 
the result was an ‘anti-economical capital flight of the largest magnitude’ (Themaat 
1966:838). The emergence of offshore capital markets further added to the appeal of 
international tax evasion by reducing the attendant currency risk. If a capital owner 
residing in country A invested in country B in order to evade domestic capital income 
taxes, she ran the risk that country B’s currency would depreciate, and thus reduce the 
value of her assets in terms of her home country’s currency. Offshore markets took 
care of this risk by allowing for foreign investments in domestic currency. For exam-
ple, an offshore market physically located in country B would trade assets and liabili-
ties denominated in the currency of country A. This allowed tax evaders from country 
A to hold their capital in B, and thus beyond the reach of A’s tax collectors, but in A’s 
currency, i.e., without any currency risk. This advantage, according to some observ-
ers, was a key factor behind the rapid growth of offshore or Euro-markets during the 
1960s and 1970s: ‘Half of all Eurobonds are held by individuals, whose motives are a 
combination of the security offered by a hard-currency investment in a high-rated 
borrower, as well as tax evasion’ (Picciotto 1992). 
While offshore markets were a new phenomenon, multinational companies were 
not. Many major industrial and raw material enterprises were already established on a 
global level by the end of the nineteenth century. However, for a variety of reasons—
the European recovery, the improved military position of Europe after Stalin’s death, 
convertibility of most European currencies, the creation of the EEC—transnational 
corporate activity rose sharply from the late 1950s. The ascendancy of the multina-
tional corporation increased concerns about tax avoidance for two reasons. First, the 
real investments of multinational companies are likely to be more tax sensitive than 
the investments of purely national companies. While it is improbable that a purely 
German company would terminate its operation in Germany and move to, say, Ire-
land, to take advantage of lower corporate taxes there, it appears much more probable 
that an American multinational company that wants to set up shop in the Common 
Market would be attracted by low Irish taxes and locate its European headquarters 
there rather than in Germany. Second, and potentially more importantly, the simulta-
neous presence of multinational companies in various countries allows them to opti-
mise their tax liabilities between these countries (international tax planning). They 
can, for example, manipulate the prices used in internal exchanges in order to artifi-
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cially shift profits from high tax to low tax countries. For this purpose, company sub-
sidiaries in low-tax locations will charge inflated prices for deliveries to subsidiaries 
in high-tax countries, and, in turn, pay deflated prices for deliveries from them (trans-
fer pricing). Other techniques can also reduce the tax bill of the multinational corpora-
tion as a whole. The specifics are complicated but the basic concept is simple: taxable 
profit is rerouted from parts of the company located in high-tax countries to parts lo-
cated in low-tax countries, and is then stored there. The company saves taxes, high-
tax countries lose revenue.  
Tax Competition 
Tax avoidance and evasion brought formerly separate tax systems into contact. How 
much money the tax authorities raised no longer depended on national tax levels alone 
but also on foreign tax levels. Low foreign tax levels threatened to depress domestic 
revenues by causing an outflow of mobile tax base. High foreign tax levels, in turn, 
promised to boost domestic revenues by attracting mobile tax base in from abroad. 
One country’s revenue became dependent on other countries' tax policies. This inter-
dependence created not only constraints for national tax policy but also opportunities. 
Governments could exploit it to their advantage by undercutting the tax rates of other 
countries. Tax-sensitive business activities could be lured away from foreign markets 
and into the home economy, bringing in their wake not only additional revenues but 
also growth, employment, and wealth. This was a particularly attractive option for 
small countries. Small countries have little domestic tax base to lose but a lot of for-
eign tax base to win. Hence, the chance that lower tax rates will be overcompensated 
for by an enlargement of the tax base is rather high. This is why tax havens are always 
relatively small countries, and why it is always large countries that feel victimized by 
them (Dehejia and Genschel 1999). 
Already in the 1960s, the US was incensed by what it saw as the blatant abuse of 
Swiss holding companies for the purpose of reducing the tax bills of American multi-
nationals in the US. In reaction, Congress passed a first piece of ‘anti-avoidance’ leg-
islation in 1962, intended to limit the tax advantages that US-based enterprises could 
derive from holding companies in foreign tax havens. Other (large) countries also 
began to look into the problem. In 1973, for example, France and Germany formally 
requested the EC Commission to investigate the fiscal treatment of holding companies 
in Luxembourg. They suspected that these companies were being misused by multina-
tional enterprises for the purpose of reducing French and German tax liabilities. Lux-
embourg, they insisted, should not be allowed to take a fiscal free ride at their expense 
(Genschel 2002b). 
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To Luxembourg, of course, the issue decidedly did not look like free-riding. In a 
debate on the Commission’s holding report, a socialist MEP from Luxembourg asked 
the Commission ‘whether it felt that it ought to organize the capital movement of 
holding companies towards Liechtenstein or the Swiss canton of Glaraus (sic!), rather 
than allowing these companies to establish themselves in a Community financial cen-
tre where, apart from anything else, they provided employment for young professional 
people’ (Bulletin of the EC 6-1973:83). From Luxembourg’s point of view, the hold-
ing law was part of a national development strategy. Luxembourg’s old industrial base 
in coal and steel was in decline, and the financial service industry looked like a prom-
ising substitute. Helping this industry through appropriate (low-)tax legislation would, 
it was believed, eventually also benefit France and Germany through better access to 
capital and more efficient financial intermediation. Other countries followed Luxem-
bourg’s example. In 1983, for example, Belgium established a preferential tax regime 
for so-called co-ordination centers that provided overhead functions, such as financ-
ing, accounting, or captive insurance for multinational companies. Shortly thereafter, 
Ireland established the so-called International Financial Services Center in Dublin—a 
regime that awards a special, reduced corporate tax rate of only 10 percent to compa-
nies providing financial services to non-residents. Outside Europe the number of tax 
havens also increased, as small states such as the Seychelles, the Netherlands Antilles, 
and Barbados entered the business of providing individuals and corporations with a 
low-tax basis for international tax planning activities. The selling point of these loca-
tions was that they provided protection from foreign taxation without the need to 
physically relocate there, i.e., people and companies did not actually work and operate 
in the tax havens, they just let themselves be taxed there. Tax havens offer ‘juridical 
rather than de facto abodes’ (Palan 2002:163). 
Tax competition, however, is not limited to a contest for attracting virtual activity. 
Governments also use low tax strategies to attract real economic activity, i.e., real 
investment in ‘real’ production. When Ireland entered the EC in 1973, for example, it 
insisted on the right to apply a reduced corporate tax rate to all manufacturing opera-
tions, with a view to increasing inward investment. This strategy is generally seen as 
quite successful and as a major ingredient in the long Irish boom of the 1990s. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that Ireland has become a role model for the new EU 
Member States from Eastern Europe. The Baltic States and Slovakia in particular have 
made low or no corporation taxes2 a selling point of their economic policies, and have 
thereby attracted the wrath of some of the old member states. The German govern-
ment has been particularly outspoken in its criticism of fiscal free-riding. The emerg-
                                                 
2 Estonia charges no corporation tax on retained profits. 
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ing conflict shows the same normative ambiguities as the conflict with Luxembourg 
some thirty years ago. On the one hand, it is true that the large countries are taken 
advantage of: after all, a small country’s low tax strategy only pays off if another high 
tax country loses tax base. On the other hand, it is unclear on what normative and le-
gal grounds the large Member States can deny their smaller peers the freedom to 
structure their national tax systems to national advantage.  
The Transnationalisation of the Tax Base 
The twin problems of tax avoidance/evasion and tax competition are exacerbated by a 
third one: the transnationalisation of the tax base. The traditional architecture of the 
tax state was based on the assumption that all taxable events have a clearly identifi-
able place in space: either they fall within a national tax jurisdiction, and are therefore 
liable to national tax, or they fall within the jurisdiction of some other state, and are 
therefore liable to tax there (Tanzi 1995). Of course, this notion of a ‘natural nexus’ 
between tax base and a particular territory has always been a fiction. Some taxable 
events, such as inheritance, always posed problems for separate national taxation. If 
somebody died in country A while the heir resided in country B, in which state did the 
inheritance take place and become liable to tax? These exceptions were of little prac-
tical importance, however, and did not significantly reduce the workability of the ‘na-
tural nexus’ assumption. The process of globalisation threatens to make transnational 
tax bases less of an exception, thereby raising the difficulties of establishing nexus 
(Bird and Wilkie 2000). Two developments in particular contribute to this: the ascen-
dancy of multinational corporations and the emergence of electronic commerce.  
The problem with multinational corporations is that their organisational reality is 
not adequately reflected in law. At the organisational level, they constitute a transna-
tional whole. At the legal level, however, they are fragmented into a multitude of na-
tional parts. Formally, each national subsidiary of a multinational company is an in-
dependent business firm of its own. This legal fragmentation is supposed, inter alia, to 
allow each state to tax its part of the profits of the multinational company independ-
ently. However, it tends to thwart this purpose by opening up options for international 
tax planning that multinational corporations can use in order to reduce their tax liabili-
ties in high tax countries: only because subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions are inde-
pendent legal entities can they serve as tax shelters for profits generated in high tax 
jurisdictions (Palan 2002:172). Tax planning was comparatively easy for governments 
to check and control as long as the organisational structure of multinational corpora-
tions resembled a loose confederation of largely self-contained national companies, 
i.e., as long as the gap between the organisational and the legal concept of a multina-
tional enterprise was still fairly narrow. However, as most multinational companies 
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went from a confederative structure towards integrated transnational production in the 
course of globalisation, it became much harder to find meaningful criteria for the divi-
sion of overall profits. Consider a recent quarrel between GlaxoSmithKline, a big 
multinational drugs company, and the US tax authorities. At issue was how much of 
the profits of Zantac, Glaxo’s hugely successful ulcer drug, derived from advertising 
and marketing in the US, and how much from research and development in Britain (A 
Taxing Battle 2004). The problem is, of course, that there is no simple answer to this 
question because the profits reflect synergies from transnationally integrated produc-
tion. It is impossible, therefore, to allocate them unambiguously to any particular loca-
tion. This implies, on the one hand, that Glaxo potentially enjoys very large degrees of 
freedom in allocating profits between Britain and the US in the most tax efficient way. 
The mistrust of US authorities is thus well founded. On the other hand, it also implies 
that any national claim to a particular share of Glaxo’s profits is hard to justify on the 
basis of principle. 
The problem with electronic commerce is often viewed as structurally similar to 
that of integrated transnational production. Established tax rules assume that the gen-
eration of income presupposes a physical presence, i.e., a ‘permanent establishment’. 
The new information technologies challenge this assumption. Internet addresses are 
relational constructs that often do not reflect physical location. Servers routinely shift 
clients from location to location to balance loads. Buyers can log on to any server 
remotely. Service suppliers such as architects, software writers or lawyers may col-
laborate just as easily from offices in Tokyo, Palo Alto and Bremen, as they do within 
the same office building. Enterprises may conduct substantial business in countries 
where they have no ‘permanent establishment’. Territoriality-based tax claims are 
hard to justify, and hard to enforce (Owens 1998; Paris 2002). Since the burst of the 
new economy bubble, however, concern over the tax implications of electronic com-
merce has abated. As it turns out, it has proved quite difficult to effect electronic 
transactions in high tax jurisdictions without establishing any physical presence there. 
And even in cases where physical presence can be avoided, it seems relatively easy to 
adjust international tax law concepts to establish a territorial nexus—for example, by 
defining a minimum threshold of sales as constituting presence in a jurisdiction for tax 
purposes.  
COPING STRATEGIES 
Looking at aggregate revenue levels, there can be little doubt that the tax state copes 
rather well with the onslaught of globalisation. Figure 3.1 presents data for the EU, 
arguably the most economically integrated area of the world economy. It shows, first, 
that the total tax take of the average EU state is holding firm at about 40 percent of 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 10) 
- 10 - 
GDP. This is high by historical standards, and definitely much higher than during the 
years of relative economic closure in the 1950s and 1960s. The figure also shows that 
the tax base that is potentially the most mobile, most susceptible to tax avoidance and 
evasion, most endangered by tax competition, and most transnational in character, 
namely capital, contributes least to total tax revenues. Therefore, even if globalisation 
were to undermine the ability of the state to derive revenue from this basis, its impact 
on the state’s fiscal viability would be modest. Finally, there is no evidence of a de-
cline in capital tax revenues; to the contrary, Figure 3.1 suggests a slight increase 
since the mid-1980s. If tax revenues have declined at all, then in labour taxation and 
not in capital taxation.  



















taxes on labour taxes on consumption taxes on capital
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Some observers conclude from this rather innocuous picture that globalisation has not 
really changed much for the tax state. It retains considerable taxing power: govern-
ments ‘wishing to expand the public economy for political reasons may do so (includ-
ing increasing taxes on capital to pay for new spending)’ (Garrett 1998:823; Quinn 
1997; Swank 2002). This conclusion, however, is not completely warranted. First, it 
overlooks the fact that globalisation was not the only challenge that the tax state had 
to meet during the 1980s and 1990s; there was also slow growth and massive unem-
ployment, and there were high spending requirements, especially in social policy. 
Given these internal challenges, globalisation did not trap the tax state in a race to the 
bottom in taxation so much as box it in between external pressures to reduce the tax 
burden on capital, on the one hand, and internal pressures to maintain revenue levels 
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and relieve the tax burden on labour, on the other. Tax aggregates did not change 
much, not because globalisation was business as usual for the tax state but because the 
tax state was left with very little room to maneuver (Ganghof 2000; Genschel 2002a; 
Swank and Steinmo 2002). Second, the continuity in aggregate indicators masks un-
derlying structural changes. Precisely because they had so little freedom to adjust tax 
levels in reaction to globalisation, governments looked for revenue-neutral ways to 
make their national tax systems more globalisation-proof. To this end they introduced 
an increasingly complex body of anti-avoidance and evasion legislation; they intensi-
fied international cooperation in tax matters, and, most importantly, they fundamen-
tally reformed their income tax systems. 
Anti-avoidance and Evasion Legislation 
Since the 1960s, practically all OECD-states have developed anti-avoidance rules to 
rein in international tax planning. The basic purpose of these rules is to limit the tax 
advantages that multinational companies can derive from their legal fragmentation 
(Ganghof 2000:623). Transfer pricing and thin capitalisation regulations limit the ex-
tent to which multinational companies can use commercial or financial transactions 
between subsidiaries to optimise their overall tax load. ‘Controlled Foreign Company’ 
legislation restricts their freedom to evacuate profits to subsidiaries in tax havens. By 
attributing part of the income of the tax haven subsidiary to the parent company at 
home, this legislation reduces the benefits of offshore deferral and, hence, the leeway 
for international tax planning. Some governments, including those of the US, Austra-
lia and Great Britain, have also introduced advance information requirements obliging 
tax advisers to reveal to national tax authorities the tax avoidance schemes they sell to 
corporate customers. This reduces the information gap between tax authorities and tax 
planners. The problem with anti-avoidance rules is that they tend to be exceedingly 
complex. Compliance and administration costs are high for tax payers and tax authori-
ties alike, and must be balanced against any potential revenue gain.3 Also, to the ex-
tent that anti-avoidance rules are successful in effectively reducing opportunities for 
artificial cross-border shifts of profits, they may increase the incentives to shift the 
underlying profit generating assets. An out-migration of production facilities, how-
                                                 
3 It is hard to come by data on the exact magnitude of the compliance and administrative costs connected to anti-
avoidance rules. It is interesting to note, however, that in a country such as the United Kingdom, the total ad-
ministrative compliance costs of the tax system are estimated to be 1.5 percent of GDP, which implies that tax 
administration is an industry as large as agriculture, forestry and fishing. Owens, J. 1997. Emerging Issues in 
Taxing Business in a Global Economy. In Taxing International Business. Emerging Trends in APEC and 
OECD Economies, edited by R. Vann. Paris: OECD. 
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ever, is much more painful than the out-migration of mobile tax base because it harms 
not only tax revenues but also growth and employment.  
Anti-evasion measures focus mostly on personal capital income from interest and 
dividends. Unlike corporations, individuals are not subject to elaborate bookkeeping 
requirements. If individual capital owners hold their assets abroad, national tax au-
thorities will usually not know. Some observers, like Jeffrey Owens, the head of 
OECD's Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, conclude that taxes on private 
capital income are now ‘almost a voluntary tax’: they can be evaded at liberty (Owens 
1993:33). Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that anti-evasion measures can be 
effective at deterring capital tax evasion. During the 1990s, German tax authorities 
conducted a series of well-publicized country-wide investigations of German banks, 
prosecuting bank managers for aiding and abetting international tax evasion during 
the 1990s (Ganghof 2000:624). Of course, they uncovered only a fraction of total Ger-
man capital tax evasion, but they sent a powerful signal to potential tax evaders and 
their helpers about the unpleasant consequences if detected. The cost-benefit balance 
of tax evasion was thus somewhat tilted towards the cost side.  
International Cooperation 
Tax policy experts like Vito Tanzi, an economist associated with the International 
Monetary Fund for decades, often lament the lack of international cooperation in taxa-
tion (Tanzi 1999), but it does exist, and it has a fairly long history. As early as the 
nineteenth Century, states began to conclude bilateral tax treaties, codifying common 
rules for sharing trans-national tax bases. These helped the contracting parties to keep 
their tax systems separate even in cases where they participated in the same tax base. 
As long as trans-national tax bases were few in number and fiscally unimportant, the 
number of tax treaties remained low: by the mid-1950s only about 100 treaties had 
been concluded worldwide. With the advent of globalisation, however, the treaty net-
work began to expand. Today, it connects virtually all OECD member states to each 
other and extends to almost all other countries worldwide, with the total number of 
treaties approaching 2300. Why the tax treaty regime is still organised bilaterally al-
though, as many argue, a multilateral regime would be much more efficient and effec-
tive is, in itself, an interesting question (Rixen and Rohlfing 2004). Still, there can be 
no doubt that the spread of this regime is a reaction to the increased coordination 
needs of national tax administrations in a globalised economy.  
Recently, international institutions such as the OECD and the EU have also be-
come active in the fight against international tax evasion and avoidance. In 1998, the 
OECD started a project on so-called ‘harmful tax practises’ (OECD 2004; Radaelli 
2001:10-18). One purpose was to coax tax havens outside the OECD into agreement 
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on common standards on information exchange in civil and criminal tax matters. Only 
a handful of tax havens, including Andorra, Liechtenstein, and the Marshall Islands, 
still refuse to accept this international infringement on their sovereign right to ‘com-
mercialise’ their state sovereignty (Palan 2002). In contrast to the OECD project, 
which aims only at forcing tax havens to provide relevant tax information upon re-
quest, the recent EU directive on the taxation of interest income provides for an auto-
matic exchange of all tax relevant information between the member states (European 
Community 2003). If a financial institution in member state A pays out interest to a 
resident of member state B, it will automatically inform B’s tax authorities about this. 
The scope for international capital tax evasion in the Internal Market is thus substan-
tially reduced while the national tax sovereignty of the member states is buttressed.  
International institutions have been less successful in fighting international tax 
competition. The problem is that, unlike cooperation against tax evasion and avoid-
ance, international cooperation against tax competition tends to limit rather than but-
tress national tax sovereignty. Since tax competition is driven by incentives to under-
cut other countries’ (effective) tax rates, the way to stop it is to agree on some harmo-
nized level of tax rates. Some countries, such as the UK, object to such harmonisation 
for reasons of principle. They insist that the national parliament and not an interna-
tional body should have the final say on tax levels. Other states, especially small and 
relatively poor ones, object to the idea of tax rate harmonisation for reasons of na-
tional interest; for them, tax competition is not a threat but a promising strategy for 
national development. This is why Ireland, for example, has always opposed attempts 
to harmonize corporate tax rates in the EU (Dehejia and Genschel 1999). 
Tax Reform 
The most important tax policy response to globalisation has been tax reform. Practi-
cally all OECD countries revamped their tax systems during the 1980s and 1990s with 
a view to making them more competitive and globalisation-proof. The most visible 
result of this was a significant drop in the corporate tax rate: In the average OECD-
country it fell from about 50 percent in 1983 to about 30 percent in 2003, and looks 
set to fall even further (Ganghof 2004). Since the tax cuts were paralleled by measures 
to broaden the tax base, they did not usually result in substantial tax revenue losses. 
This did not mean, however, that they were painless.  
The problem is that corporate income tax is intimately linked with personal income 
tax. The distinction between corporate profits and personal income is one of legal 
form rather than material difference. Hence, if corporate income is taxed at signifi-
cantly lower rates than (top) personal income, (rich) taxpayers can potentially save tax 
by reclassifying their personal labour and/or capital income as corporate income 
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(Slemrod 2004:1171). As a consequence, most OECD countries have tended in the 
past to treat the corporate and the individual income tax as a more or less integrated 
block (with more or less aligned tax rates and tax base definitions) rather than as two 
completely separate taxes.  
Tax competition forced governments to slice up this block. There were basically 
two options for doing this (Ganghof 2004). One option was to slice up the block verti-
cally so as to separate the taxation of mobile income, which is susceptible to tax com-
petition (mostly corporate profits and personal capital income) from the taxation of 
immobile income, which is not (mostly wage income). This option was taken, for ex-
ample, by the Swedish government in 1991, when it introduced its so-called dual in-
come tax system. The essence of the dual income tax is to remove capital income 
from the scope of the progressive individual income tax and to tax it separately at low 
proportional rates. Personal capital income is now taxed at a uniform rate of 30 per-
cent, which is closely aligned with the corporate tax rate of 28 percent. Labour in-
come, by contrast, continues to be taxed at fairly steep progressive rates. The top indi-
vidual income rate stands at 57 percent. The advantage of the dual Income tax system 
is that it increases competitiveness at minimal fiscal cost. It targets tax cuts to where 
they matter most in terms of tax competition and are most easily made up through tax 
base broadening, and thus avoids unnecessary revenue losses. However, there is a 
price to be paid in terms of efficiency and equity. In terms of efficiency, the problem 
is that the gap between the top personal income tax rate and the proportional rate on 
capital income weakens the backstop function of the corporate tax. Given the gap, 
there is an incentive to reclassify labour income as capital income. This makes taxa-
tion difficult wherever labour and capital income accrue jointly, as, for example, in 
unincorporated businesses or closely held corporations. The equity problem is that 
one Swedish Crown in capital income is no longer liable to the same amount of in-
come tax as one Swedish Crown of labour income. True, there are good economic 
arguments for taxing capital income at lower rates—or not at all. However, it is hard 
to sell these arguments politically: after all, why should (rich) heirs contribute less to 
the common good than (poor) wage earners? The efficiency and the equity problems 
of the dual income tax increase with the size of the tax rate gap between capital and 
labour income. The higher the tax rate on labour and the lower the tax rate on capital, 
the more difficult it becomes to police the border between them, and to explain to an 
electorate of mostly wage earners why this tax system is in their interest. Stabilizing 
the tax rate gap, or even increasing it in the face of increased tax competition, are, 
therefore, major problems of the dual-income tax.  
The alternative reform option avoids these problems by cutting tax rates across all 
types of income. This is basically what the Red-Green coalition government in Ger-
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many tried to accomplish with its tax reform of 2001. In order to increase competi-
tiveness without sacrificing the formally equal tax treatment of capital and wage in-
come, it reduced corporate and top individual income taxes to roughly the same rate: 
they are set to fall to 42 percent (income tax) and 38 percent (corporate tax including 
local business tax) by 2005. The major drawback of this reform option is, of course, 
that it multiplies the fiscal costs of adjustment to tax competition. By de-taxing (im-
mobile) labour income in order to make taxes on (mobile) capital and corporate in-
come more competitive, it causes huge revenue losses where it does not matter in 
terms of tax competition (since labour is mostly immobile there is hardly any inter-
jurisdictional competition in labour taxation), and which are very difficult to make up 
for by base broadening. Despite all attempts at base broadening, it is estimated that 
the German reform will reduce total income tax revenues by 1.3 percent of GDP. 
Such a revenue loss will be very difficult to accommodate, especially if low growth 
and high unemployment continue. This approach, too, suffers from a serious equity 
problem. While it defends horizontal equity—different types of income are taxed 
equally—it reduces vertical equity. The reduction of top personal income tax rates 
decreases progressivity at the high end of the income spectrum; the concomitant reve-
nue losses have to be compensated for by spending cuts or by more regressive taxes 
such as VAT, both of which are likely to burden low to medium income earners more 
than high income earners.  
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TAX STATE  
Ten or fifteen years ago it was fashionable in academic circles to make dire predic-
tions about what globalisation would do to the nation state. Nothing less than the very 
survival of the state seemed to be in question. Today, probably in embarrassment at 
this former misjudgement, it is fashionable to doubt that globalisation is of any conse-
quence to the nation state. Governing in the globalised world is now portrayed as mo-
re or less business as usual; nothing much has changed for the state. The truth, of 
course, lies somewhere in between the two extremes. Globalisation is neither fatal nor 
irrelevant for the nation state; it is one important factor in its continuous transforma-
tion. This paper has analysed how globalisation contributes to the transformation of 
the state by affecting the state’s main source of revenue, taxation.  
There is no doubt that taxation will remain the main revenue source of the modern 
state. Globalisation has not visibly undermined tax revenue. There has been no per-
ceptible drop in the tax levels of OECD countries. To the contrary, globalisation has 
been accompanied, over the past twenty years, by historically high levels of taxation. 
Also, globalisation has not undermined taxation as the organizing principle of public 
finance. There simply is no alternative conception of public income generation that 
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could potentially raise more revenue at less opportunity costs. There seems to be no 
substitute for taxes: taxation’s erstwhile rival, state socialism, is passé (Goldscheid 
1917). The idea that the state should live off its own economic activities rather than 
participate ‘parasitically’ via taxation in the private economic activities of its citizens, 
has lost much of the appeal that it enjoyed during important periods of the twentieth 
century. There also seems to be no substitute for the state as the taxing unit. The 
‘globalisation of taxation’, as Roland Paris (2002) recently put it, that is, the idea that 
taxation could be lifted from the level of the nation state to the supranational level of 
international institutions, has so far failed to gain any support. Even in the EU, where 
economic integration is deeper and tax coordination further developed than anywhere 
else in the world, the proposal of a Euro-tax has, so far, been a non-starter. Comparing 
today’s utopian visions for the EU’s future (Strauss-Kahn 2004) with expert reports 
from the 1960s (Neumark Report 1963), it appears that the Europeanisation of taxa-
tion was considered a much more realistic option back then than it is now.  
Even if globalisation does not threaten the organizing principle or overall size of 
the tax state, it is, nevertheless, a challenge. By increasing the interdependencies be-
tween national economies, it increases the interdependencies between national tax 
regimes. These interdependencies present governments with a new set of tax policy 
problems: industrial competitiveness, international tax avoidance and evasion, tax 
competition, and transnational tax bases. Governments have reacted to these chal-
lenges in two ways. First, they have adopted measures to increase their boundary con-
trol. Such measures include unilateral acts of new or strengthened anti-avoidance and 
evasion legislation to stop mobile tax base from leaking out of the national domain. 
They also include international cooperation to reinforce national control—for exam-
ple, through cross-border information exchange or common sharing rules for transna-
tional tax bases. The tax treaty regime and OECD and EU activities against tax eva-
sion and ‘harmful tax practices’ are the most visible outcomes of this cooperation.  
Secondly, governments have reformed their national tax systems in order to make 
them more competitive and less costly to the owners of mobile tax bases. To be sure, 
large cross-national differences remain in terms of tax level and tax mix. Yet there has 
been a strong convergence with respect to policy priorities and reform patterns 
(Steinmo 2003). Efficiency and neutrality have replaced equity and redistribution as 
key criteria of a ‘good’ tax policy. Tax reforms invariably aim to cut top personal and 
corporate income tax rates while at the same time broadening the tax bases, and to 
finance any attendant revenue loss—or additional revenue needs—through other more 
regressive taxes, such as VAT and social security contributions. 
In conclusion, globalisation has triggered important changes in the tax state. How-
ever, the significance of these changes pale in comparison to the changes the tax state 
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experienced during the period of ‘national containment’, i.e. roughly the time between 
World War I and 1970, when the introduction of a set of new taxes—the personal 
income tax, the corporate tax, general consumption taxes, and social security contri-
butions—completely revolutionized the tax state’s revenue base and architecture. In 
fact, the most striking contrast between then and now is how much volatility and 
change there was then and how much stability and incrementalism there is now. 
Hence, globalisation’s most important consequence may not be to be so much to force 
change upon the tax state but to limit its freedom to change. The status quo is not fun-
damentally threatened. But it has become harder for any one government to change 
that status quo unilaterally. Globalisation rather than undermining the tax state, 
freezes it in its current form.  
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